The United States Supreme Court has released another important Sentencing case dealing with The Armed Career Criminal Act and Mandatory Minimum sentences
Begay pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. His prior record included a dozen New Mexico DUI convictions, which become felonies after the third offense. At sentencing, the district court concluded that felony DUI is a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act and, because Begay had at least three of them, imposed the mandatory minimum 15-year sentence.
For ACCA purposes, a "violent felony" is "any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" that "(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." In Begay, the court assumed that his DUI convictions didn't fall under (i) and were not one of the listed offenses in (ii), so the issue was whether it falls under the "otherwise" clause.
In answering that question, the Court importantly assumed that DUI "presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." Nonetheless, it concluded that DUI is not a violent felony because it is not of the same type of offense - involving purposeful, aggressive, and violent conduct - as the offenses listed in (ii). In other words, those offenses are listed in the statute to limit its reach. The Court rejected the Government's argument that the "otherwise" clause could apply to any offense that presented a risk of injury, holding that to do so would render the other parts of the definition superfluous. To do so would overlook the point of the ACCA - the deal harshly with repeat, violent offenders who are prone to use firearms.
Five justices signed on to that opinion. Scalia concurs in the judgment, arguing that the "otherwise" clause does cover every potential offense, but that he couldn't tell whether DUI posed the necessary risk to be covered. Alito (joined by Souter and Thomas) dissents, charging the majority with making up the "purposeful, aggressive, and violent" requirement out of wholecloth.
In addition to its obvious application in ACCA cases, Begay could be big in the career offender context. The definition of "crime of violence" in 4B1.2(a) is essentially the same as the ACCA "violence felony" definition, with one exception not relevant here. It lists four enumerated offenses and includes and identical "otherwise" clause. Thus, the analysis of Begay and the "purposeful, aggressive, and violent" test can apply to offenses other than DUIs when determining career offender status.
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